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Abstract 
It is introduced the concept of Superiority Degree one competitive 
decision over another. On the basis of this concept the mathematics – 
theoretic structure is developed, which is part of pairs - comparisons 
branch in modern decision making theory. It will be useful for 
practice and interesting for scientific research. 
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l. Introduction. 
The famous American cybernetics F.George, analyzing in his book: "The Foundations 
of Cybernetics" the stages of cybernetics' development in future, writes: That we may 
expect progress in all schools, but essentially in creation of the computer programs keeping 
decision making principles on the analogy of the same ones in humans. 
The correspondent investigation on decision making has been conductor in the Institute 
of Cybernetics of Georgia from the very beginning of its foundation. As this paper would 
has been writing for the collection devoted to 40`h jubilee of our Institute, let us turn back to 
history. 
    The year 1967, The Third All - Union Symposium on Cybernetics organized by the 
Institute of Cybernetics of Georgia - "Decision making in humans" was one of the three 
problems being discussed. The thesis's book has been published. 
The year 1972, The Sixth All - Union Symposium on Cybernetics organized by the 
Institute of Cybernetics of Georgia - devoted clear to "Decision making in humans' all kind 
activities. Six volumes of thesis were published. (Russian). 
The year 1979, The Soviet-American Symposium on the subject of Normative and 
Descriptive Models of decision making, Tbilisi, the Institute of Cybernetics of Georgia was 
one among the organizers. The book of accounts named similarly has been 
published(English and Russian). 
The year 1985, Berlin, Symposium on System Analysis and Simulation. Many accounts 
devoted to the decision making systems (complex) opposite decision making procedures 
were presented. The plenary report has been suggested from the Institute of Cybernetics of 
Georgia. 
There were other International Fo>:ums included always the decisions making sections. 
Every 2-3 years during the 70-80`h the Seminar on the Operation Research and System 
Analysis has been conducting by the laboratory of "Decision Making Theory", very popular 
among the decision making specialists as it was the sole in USSR wholly devoted to 
multicriteria decision making problems. It was conducted in Kutaisi or Batumi as usual and 
was named by ORSA-N. 
Overlooking the numerous of our publications including foreign ones, note that the 
most resonance has been attended in the main to our investigations on Fuzzy Multicriteria 
Decision Making Problems. However we have at once interesting results in other branch of 
the Decision making theory. There are investigations associated with concept of the 
superiority degree of one decision over another. Such conception has been introduced at 
first in [1] in context of group (social) decisions of the modern Decision making theory 
which are very  
wide and multiform. The pair-comparison branch of this theory is one of the most important 
being the basic for other ones. We have presented in this paper the theoretic-mathematical 
construction (the ABC of theory) of the degree superiority for the pair-comparison. 
2.Preference Relations 
 
   In scientific research on decision making problems preference relations occupy the most part 
as research tools. They are defined and noted first by Fishborn [3]. It is no wonder because they 
allow to compare one decision with other so as to choose better of them in some concrete 
situation of decision making. Theory of preference relations is elaborated now already [2,7]. 
This theory, which is necessary for this article. 
Let X is set of competitive decisions  (alternatives), it is finite. Then E = X x X is set 
of all ordered pairs of decisions. Mathematically preference relation is defined as ,  i.e. it 
is also set and all set theory operations may be used on R. Any preference relation is binary 
relation. Inverse preference relation R
ER ⊆
-1 corresponds to any R in the following way: if pair  
(x, y)∈  R ,  then pair (y, x) ∈R-1. Inverse preference relation R-1 has all those characteristics 
which corresponding preference relation R has. Any R is composed by two components: 
identity relation  Re = R I R-l,  strict preference relation RS = R \  R -1 and, it is clear, that R = 
ReU sR ,  but Re  R'  =∅  . If each of them is transitive, then RI e is equivalence relation and 
sR  is strict order. One of them may be empty. But if both preferences are non-empty, then R is 
non-strict preference relation or quasi-order when it is transitive. Any preference relation R 
may be connected or disconnected. It is connected when all decisions pairs from E are 
comparable by R, i.e. (x y) ∈  R or (y, x) ∈  R -1 are fulfilled simultaneously. Some set 
 corresponds to preference relation R. It is its core, which contains maximal or 
effective decisions. We name it Pareto-set similarly with multicriteria decision making 
problems. It may be empty, but if R is transitive then always 
XRX ⊆Π )(
∅≠Π )(RX . Let present also 
following results: 
     1. For two preference relations R l and R2 if condition  ,  then .  ss RR 21 ⊆ )()( 12 RXRX ΠΠ ⊆
     2. Preference relation Rl is coordinated with preference relation  if conditions  2R
ss RR 21 ⊆
and  fulfill simultaneously. In this case .  ll 21 RR ⊆ )()( 12 RXRX ΠΠ ⊆
   We shall present the other results and notions when they will be needed. 
   2. Superiority Degree (SD). Let present two classes of functions: 
         { }),(),(),( xyyxyxH ψψψ −==  
         They are skew - symmetric functions. 
         { }),(),(),(),( yxyzzxyxT ϕϕϕϕ =+=  
this is a condition of transitivity. 
  Functions ),( yxψ  and ),( yxϕ  are scalar and x, y, z are from X - set. 
Definition 1. Let note any scalar function ),( yxϕ  defined on the set E as superiority degree 
of one competitive decision x ∈  X over other competitive decision y ∈  X if it is skew-
symmetric, i.e. ),( yxϕ ∈   H . 
Basic characteristics of SD: 
  a)   , where  *),( ϕϕϕ ≤≤− ∗ yx ),(max
),(
* yx
Eyx
ϕϕ
∈
=
 b) 0),(),( =+ xyyx ϕϕ   
c) 0),( =xxϕ . If 0),( =yxϕ  , then x and y are identical 
d)                                                                                      (3) 0),( =∑∑
∈∈ XyXx
yxϕ
   0),()()( =∑∑
∈∈ XyXx
yxyx ϕλλ
 
where 0)( ≥xλ  and                                             ∑
∈
=
Xx
x 1)(λ
 
  The coefficients )(xλ  are interpreted as "weights" or coefficients of significance of 
decisions. 
In contrast to rations scale all results in this article, stated by. using SD, will be 
given in differences scale. We make a remark because all known publications on these 
problems use rations scale. 
Definition 2. Let note following scalar function F(x, y) defined on the set E as Integral 
(global) Superiority Degree (ISD): [∑
∈
−⋅=
Xz
zyzxzyxF ),(),()(),( ϕϕλ ]                                                                             (4) 
where ),( yxϕ  is SD, i.e. ),( yxϕ ∈  H . 
  In this case two decisions x and y are compared with one an other non-directly but by 
means of third decision (reference point) z. Because ),( yxϕ  is difference estimation 
the difference in formula 4 don't contradict to common sense. Basic characteristics of 
ISD: 
    I. F(x, y)= -F(y, x) , i.e. F(x, y) ∈ H and it is superiority   degree. 
   2. Hence it possesses all characteristics of SD (formulae 3), 
  3. F(x, y)∈ T always independently of corresponding characteristic for ),( yxϕ , 
 4. But if ),( yxϕ ∈  T , then F(x, y) = ),( yxϕ . 
The last two characteristics are most significant. ISD possesses many positive 
aspects, which will be presented in this article. But it possesses negative aspect too. 
Crossing out or addition decisions in X in general influence on comparison of 
decisions. We take into consideration this fact and try to neutralize it by control 
actions. 
3. Interconnection SD and ISD with preference relation R. Let given any    
preference relation R. Now we can form several SD connected with this R. 
This connection is based on following concept: 
Definition 3. Scalar function ),( yxϕ ∈  H is named as coordinated with 
preference relation R if the conditions: 
           , 0),(),( >→∈ yxRyx s ϕ
                                                                                       (5) 0),(),( =→∈ yxRyx ϕl
These conditions may be used for ISD too, i.e. for function F(x, y) . 
On other hand, if initial information received by experts inquiry or by any other 
way is presented as SD , the corresponding preference relation may be formed always 
by following formula: 
           { ll >∈= ),(),()( yxEyxR ϕ }                                                                     (6) 
where constant . This is a binary preference relation, which we name as -
level preference relation and analyze it later. 
0≥l l
Affirmation 1. If some preference relation R is coordinated with R(0); given by 
formula 6, then it is coordinated with ),( yxϕ  , too (definition 3 ). 
Proofs of affirmations we don't present in this article. R(0) is always connected 
because ),( yxϕ   is defined for all pair (x, y) ∈ E . Mean while R may be disconnected. 
Therefore in formula 5 arrows are directed only to one side. 
     4. Utility Function (UF). Initial information for decision making problem is obtained by 
comparison of decisions pairs. Comparison means may be different. 
But results are R or ),( yxϕ . Since some superiority degree is connected with any 
preference relation one can assume, that initial information is presented as scalar skew 
symmetric   function ),( yxϕ , i.e. SD is presented. One of most difficult problem is the 
ordering of set X on the basis of the results of pairs comparisons. The ordering means to 
define utility function on X. 
Affirmation 2. If THyx I∈),(ϕ  (formulae 1 and 2 ) then it can be represented as the 
difference )()(),( yfxfyx −=ϕ , where f (x) is some potential function [4]. And following 
formula takes place: 
                                ∑
∈
=
Xy
yxyxf ),(.)()( ϕλ
   In partial case we may assume, that    
n
y 1)( =λ    , where n is number of competitive  
decisions in X . Potential f (x) order set X and thus it is utility function. Many way are of 
conversion of pairs comparisons into UF. But they use intuition, experience, common sense 
and concrete of decision making situation. That is why we attach very importance this result 
(affirmation 2, formulae 7 ). This affirmation introduces in foregoing problem generality 
(universality), formal basis, completeness and it defines those conditions, which are necessary 
for problem solving. In practical work usually Tyx ∉),(ϕ , i.e. the transitive condition is 
infringed (formulae 2 ). 
   But then we can form (formulae 4 ) and use ISD with F(x,y), we know, that 
 always fulfils. Hence using affirmation 2 we may write following formulae: THyxF I∈),(
                                                                     (8) )()(),( yqxqyxF −=
  where  ∑
∈
=
Xy
yxFyxq ),(.)()( λ
   The last one is utility function defined on X. Thus we can order X always on the basis of 
data of pairs comparisons. Allowed transformations for f (x) and q(x) are linear: they don't 
infringe initial order given on X. 
Affirmation 3 .  If  SD Tyx ∈),(ϕ  (transitive condition), then q(x) = f(x). 
  5. Multicriteria utility. 
Multicriteria Decision  Making Problems (MDMP) are the most wide-spread and very 
significant class of decision making problems in modern decision making theory. In this case 
each decision is estimated on the basis of several criteria. And then we have the set Φ   of 
scalar functions, defined on E: 
             { }),(),...,,(),...,,(1 yxyxyx mj ϕϕϕΦ =                                           (9) 
Affirmation 4 . If  Hyxj ∈),(ϕ  for all mj ,1=  then  Hyx ∈),(ϕ  , where 
 ∑
=
=
m
j
jj yxyyx
1
),(.)(),( ϕλϕ . If  Tyxj ∈),(ϕ  for all  mj ,1=  ,then. Tyx ∈),(ϕ   
Let THyx I∈),(ϕ  ,  then on the basis of Affirmation 2 multicriteria utility function defined 
on X may be presented by following formulae: 
                                                                       (10)  ∑∑
=∈
=
m
j
jj
Xy
yxyxL
1
),(.)()( ϕλλ
Let us prove that it is the linear convolution known in multicriteria decision  making 
problems. 
                                                                       (11) ∑
=
=
m
j
jj xKxL
1
)(.)( λ
where .∑
∈
==
Xy
jj xfyxyxK )(),()()( ϕλ  This is a some effectiveness criterion of 
"win" type, moreover,  . Hence L(x) is Pareto-effective convolution 
[2]. Pareto-set is formed by m effectiveness criteria K 
∑
=
=≥
m
j
jj
1
1,0 λλ
j (x) . 
6. - level preference relations. They are connected with SD or ISD and is 
introduced by us (formulae 6 ). They are binary preference relations, i.e.  for 
all allowed value of  . If 
l
ER ∈)(l
0≥l Hyx ∈),(ϕ  , then reverse preference relation is: 
         { ll −≤∈=− ),(),()(1 yxEyxR ϕ }                                                     (12) 
If , then  is strict, disconnected and, in general, non-transitive, preference 
relation. If , then it is connected, non-strict and also non-transitive preference 
relation. Now we shall formulate transitivity conditions for . 
0≠l )(lR
0=l
)(lR
   Affirmation 5 . If SD Tyx ∈),(ϕ   (formulae 2 ), then  is transitive for all 
allowed . This means that for 
)(lR
0≥l 0≠l  it is strict, disconnected order, but for 0=l  
it is linear quasi-order (or linear order). 
On the basis of ),( yxϕ   may be introduced identity relation 
{ }0),(),( =∈= yxEyxR ϕl Tyx. If ),( ∈ϕ , then it is equivalence relation. Let 
introduce non-strict  -level preference relation: l
                                                               (13) 0,)()( ≠= llUl l RRQ
For Tyx ∈),(ϕ   is non-strict  -level order. Let remark that for both cases 
disconnected. 
)(lQ l
Affirmation 6 . If  ,12 ll >  then  )()( 12 ll RR ⊆  and . )()( 21 ll ΠΠ XX >
For Tyx ∈),(ϕ  the Pareto-sets are non-empty. Hence we have formed the 
mathematical structure imbedding one into other non-empty Pareto-sets. This is 
conveniently for elaboration of dialogue procedures on computer (  is control 
parameter). 
l
                                  (14) XXXXX =⊆⊆⊆ ∗)()()()0( 21 lll ΠΠΠΠ
where . All  haven't meaning.  ∗<<< lll 210 ∗> ll
8. Similarity with fuzzy preference relations. 
 Affirmation 7. , where )()()( 21 llIl RRR = { }21,max lll =  and , 
where . Thus all -level preference relations,  formed on the basis of 
the same SD 
)()()( 21 llUl RRR ={ 21,min lll = } l
),( yxϕ , are closed under operations of join and intersection. 
  Let introduce yet one class of functions: 
                     { }{ }),(),,(max),(),( yzzxyxyxS ϕϕϕϕ >=                       (15) 
Affirmation 8. If Syx ∈),(ϕ  , then  is transitive for all allowed values of 
level . 
)(lR
l
  These facts are similar on some results from fuzzy sets theory. In future we want 
to determine more profound connection of superiority degree with decision 
making fuzzy problems. 
9. Example: group decisions. 
   Initial data for group (social) decisions are described as < X, N, R >, where X is 
finite set of competitive decisions (alternatives); N is number of experts in group 
(their indices are RN ;1÷=ν  is Vectors Preference Relation (VPR) obtained by 
experts inquiry and defined on set X; R consists of N components: 
R  =  { R (1),  R (2),..., R (v),..., R (N) } , (16)   
    where  is ordinary (usual) scalar binary preference relation, which map 
preference structure of expert with index v. But E = X x X is set of all ordered pairs of 
decisions. Group decisions itself is defined as result of some procedure over R ,  that is: 
ER ⊆)(ν
)(RG Π= ,  and also .                                               (17) EG ⊆
 Symbol   haven't mathematical meaning, it 's procedure notation. Let us 
introduce next function: 
Π
                      
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
∈
∈∈
∈
=
)(
)()(
)(
)(
),(,0
),(&),(,
2
1
),(,1
ν
νν
ν
νδ
Rxxif
RxxRxxif
Rxxif
ij
ijji
ji
ij                              (18) 
This function is defined on decisions pairs, i.e. Exx ji ∈),(   and  other, where Xxi ∈  
and . Xx j ∈
  It is coordinated with preference relation )(νR  in view of specific sense. We don't 
require transitivity of preference relations NR ,1,)( =νν . For describing data, received 
fully from experts group , let us determine next function also defined on the decision 
pairs: 
                                                                                        (19) ∑= N ijijn
ν
νδ )(
Now two known (traditional) group decisions can be determined in view of context 
of our article . 
Voting by majority: 
     { }jiijjisV nnExxG =∈= ),(                                                        (20)     
This is a strict preference relation, it isn't transitive in general case. Identities 
relation corresponds to it and is also non-transitive: { }jiijjiV nnExxG =∈= ),(l                                                     (21) 
These two preference relation form voting by majority: 
                         ,                                            (22) lU VsVV GGG =
 if they will be joined (together). 
K- procedure (npaвило Koплeнда): 
let us introduce following K - index for Xxi ∈  
                                                                                 (23) )(
1
∑
=
−=
m
j
jiiji nnϕ
where m is number of decisions in X. Using it we can write following group decision 
K-procedure: 
                  { }jijik xxG ϕϕ ≥= ),(  . (24) 
This is a linear order, it is transitive, K- procedure is more progressive than voting 
by majority, because each decision is compared with all other decisions from set X. 
But it is true that it is not ideal. 
   Let introduce following number function, defined on pairs of decisions: 
jiijij nnZ −= .                                                                       (25) 
    It is obvious that it is SD, because jiij ZZ −=  . Let introduce ISD too: 
                        ( )∑
=
−=
m
s
jsisij ZZF
1
 (26) 
 
 It is easy to prove that following condition takes place:  
  
                                                                                         (27) jiij VVF −=
where  is number potential function, defined on the set X and given on difference 
scale. It is (formulae 8 and 13): 
)( ii xVV =
                                                 , K-index (28) i
m
s
isi ZV ϕ== ∑
=1
Let determinate now l  -level preference relation: 
                  { }ll ≥∈= ijji FExxG ),()(                                                         (29) 
where . This is a disconnected, strict order when 0≥l 0≠l  and it is a linear order when 
. Level l  of preference relation  can be selected on the bases of practical 
considerations as in work [3] for example. 
0=l )(lG
   The interesting results can be formulated at once:  
1. G(0) is K - procedure. 
       2. Condition  sjisij ZZZ += is sufficient condition for transitivity of Voting by Majority. 
  3. When this condition takes place then K-procedure and Voting by Majority are 
equivalent [6]. 
As soon as l -level group preference relation G( l ) is formed one can define l  -level 
group decision - this is a core of G( ), i.e. Pareto-set, which will be noted by . Two 
interesting results can be proved connected with Pareto-set: 
l )(lΠX
4 .    for any value of level  . ∅≠)(lΠX l
       5. If two - level group preference relations are with levels  and l 1l l z correspondingly 
and  21 ll > then condition  (affirmation 6). )()( 12 ll ΠΠ XX ⊆
   Thus we can form the structure of imbedding one to an other non-empty Pareto-sets. 
Let remark only that the foregoing problems presented in this article deal with complete 
initial information. 
   Now we present one variant of using of SD and ISD in decision making problems with 
incomplete initial information. 
  10. Incomplete information: disconnected preference relation. In practical work the 
situations with incomplete information arise very often when some part of decisions pairs 
remain incomparable. The reasons of this fact may be very different: subjective as well as 
objective one. Disconnected preference relations correspond to this situation in 
mathematics.  
  Let disconnected preference relation NC∈E is given on the set X. 
  Let take also any decision x ∈  X . With respect to it the set X will be separated in two 
parts (two subsets): XI (x)  and X2 (x). First subset contains decisions, comparable with x 
and second subset contains decisions, in comparable with x. For any x∈  X following 
conditions holds: 
                                       XxXxX =)()( 21 U
                                                                                  (30) ∅=)()( 21 xXxX U
                    )(1 xXx∈
    Superiority degree may be introduced also in this case. 
    Definition 4. 
a) Let name as Upper Superiority Degree (USD) following value: 
           
⎩⎨
⎧
ϕ
ϕ= ∗ xwithleincomparabisyif,
xwithcomparableisyif,)y,x(
)y,x(u
b) Let name as Lower Superiority Degree (LSD) following value:  
           
⎩⎨
⎧
ϕ−
ϕ= ∗ xwithleincomparabisyif,
xwithcomparableisyif,)y,x(
)y,x(d
   where  on the set XH)y,x( ∈ϕ 1(x) ,  is maximal value of SD ∗ϕ )y,x(ϕ  - formulae 
(30, 1) are used. 
We shall explain this definition. If decisions x and y are comparable, then value for this 
pair belongs to interval . For incomparable decisions pairs we take the extreme values 
of this interval: very successful and very unsuccessful one . 
)y,x(ϕ
],[ ∗∗ ϕϕ−
Characteristic of  USD and LSD:  
   1. u(x, y) > d(x, y) always. 
     2. u(x, y) = -d(y, x) and d(y, x)= -u(x, y), 
     3. u(x,x)=d(x,x)=0, 
    4. u(x, y) > 0 and d(x, y) < 0 always.  
    Now let introduce following utility functions:  
                                                                                                 ∑
∈
=
Xy
d yxdyxf ),()()( λ
                                                                               (33) ∑
∈
=
Xy
u yxuyxf ),()()( λ
      where Tyx ∈),(ϕ  on the set X 1(x) - formulae (30,2) and affirmation 2 are used. 
Thus now the interval estimation is given for each Xx∈  on the basis of incomplete initial 
information (disconnected preference relation NS): 
[ )(),()( xfxfx ud= ]Δ                                                        (34) 
 We remark only that  ,  and equality correspond to the point estimation of x. 
Now we must order the set X on the basis of interval estimations. Such problem is studied in 
detail by us in publications [5,8] and we don't present them here: only a little information. The 
disconnected, strict order with corresponding non-empty Pareto-set is formed on X. When 
new additional information is received the previous intervals are transformed into the 
intervals, which have diminished lengths. We don't take into consideration the case of false 
information. When we receive complete information then the lengths of all intervals 
)()( xfxf du ≥
)(xΔ  will 
be equal to 0, and we shall deal with point estimations of Xx∈  (affirmation 2 ). 
Let correct the formulae 33 and 34: 
                                           (35) ∗
∈
∗
∈
⋅−=⋅−⋅= ∑∑ ϕΛϕϕλϕλ )()()(),()()(
)()( 21
xxyyxyxf
xXyxXy
d
  where )(xϕ  is some constant value corresponding received information. It is transformed only 
when additional information is obtained. And  0)( ≥xΛ  is characteristic of missing 
information. It tends to 0, when additional information is obtained and is equal to 0 under 
complete information. 
Similarly we may write and discuss: 
                                                                                           (36) ∗+= ϕΛϕ )()()( xxxfu
Criteria for the estimation of missing information size can be introduced, which will be useful 
possibly for practical work, by this way. We present three variants: 
    1. )()( xx
Xx
mean ΛλΛ ∑
∈
⋅=  , 
   2. )(maxmax xXx ΛΛ ∈=  
  3. , where  ∑
∈
=
Qx
sum x)(λΛ
They are equal to 0 under complete information. Let present yet some more several 
results. Affirmation 9. 
   a) If the transitivity condition d(x y) = d(x s) + d(s, x) , i.e. d(x, y)∈T, for all allowed 
x, y, s, then 
          )()(),( yfxfyxd ud −=                                                          (37) 
   b)  If u(x, y) T , then ∈
               u(x,y)                                                       (38) )()( yfxf du −=
 Definition 5.  
 a) Let note as Integral (global) Upper Superiority Degree (IUSD) following value: 
     U (x, y) .[u(x, r) - d (y, r)] . (39) ∑
∈
=
Xr
r)(λ
 b) Let note as Integral (global) Lower Superiority Degree (ILSD) following value: 
     D(x, y) .[d(x, r) - u(y, r)] . (40) ∑
∈
=
Xr
r)(λ
Affirmation 10. Following results always take place. 
         U(x ,y) )()( yfxf du −=  , 
       D(x• Y) )()( yfxf ud −=  .                                                                        (41)  
Let present now the characteristic of IUSD and ILSD: 
1. U(x, y) > D(x, y). 
2. U(x, y)= -D(y, x) and D(x, y) =-U(x, y) . 
3. D(x, y) = d(x y) if transitivity condition, i.e. d(x, y)∈T for all x, y, s,  
    U(x, y) = u(x, y), if  u(x, y)∈T for all  x, y, s. 
4. U(x, r) + U(r, y) = U(x, y) + U(r, r),  
   D(x, r) + D(r, y) = D(x, y) + D(r, r). 
5. In general U(r, r) ≠  0 and D(r, r) ≠  0 . 
  D(r, r)= -U(r, r) and D(r, r) ≤  0. If all decisions pairs are comparable, then  
  U(r, r) = D(r, r) = 0. It is variant with complete information. 
11. Again about group decisions: incomplete information. The group consists of N 
experts. Let pick out one decisions pair (x, y)  ∈E. Vector Preference Relation (VPR)  
R = {R(1)..., R(j) ,..., R(N) } corresponds to each pair. Analysis of it for picked out pair will 
give following result: 
1. a(x, y) experts have voted for x. 
2. b(x, y) experts have voted for y.  
      3. p(x, y) expert couldn't compare x toy. 
   All these values are the functions determined on E on the basis of R, and their sum is N 
for one pair. Now let form following values: 
     d (x,y)= (a(x,y) - b(x,y)) - p(x, y), 
      u(x, y) = (a(x ,y) - b(x, y)) + p(x, y). (42) 
   First of them is LSD and second is USD. This fact can be proved. Using the affirmation 
10 we 
have: 
              ),()(),()()( yxpyyxyxf
XyXy
d ∑∑
∈∈
⋅+⋅= λϕλ
                                                                       (43)  ),()(),()()( yxpyyxyxf
XyXy
u ∑∑
∈∈
⋅−⋅= λϕλ
  where ),( yxϕ = a(x, y) - b(x, y) and Hyx ∈),(ϕ  . 
  Thus the interval [ )(),()( xfxfx ud= ]Δ  corresponds to any x ∈  X and then we shall 
order the set X using these interval estimations [2,5]. Let remark also that 
[ ]),(),(
2
1),( yxuyxdyx +=ϕ . 
12. Conclusion. Some very simple ideas and concepts permit us to develop and to present 
you the mathematics -theoretic structure (the basis of theory ) for superiority degree and 
connected with its problems. This structure is part of pairs comparison branch in modern 
decision making theory. It will be useful for practical work and interesting for scientific 
research. Many unsolved problems are in this field yet. 
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